Commentary: Crusader still needed

WASHINGTON, May 15 (UPI) -- Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has announced termination of the Army's "Crusader" artillery system, capping a yearlong battle between his office and the Army on requirements and end strength that began when the Army leadership rebuffed previous efforts to kill the Crusader.

The Army leadership led by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki and Army Secretary Thomas E. White have been vocal supporters of increases in Army end strength -- the number of soldiers -- and the Crusader.

To the chagrin of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Congress sent a clear message last summer when scores of members signed a letter warning the secretary not to attempt to reduce end strength. Perhaps that is why Rumsfeld undermined Shinseki by announcing his replacement 14 months ahead of time and why he has shown only lukewarm support for White.

However, rhetoric that Crusader is a "relic" of the Cold War has continued without foundation. After all, the OSD needs money and Army programs and end strength always have been easy marks. Army programs are typically smaller than those of the Navy and Air Force and do not have the broad political constituency as do production of airplanes and ships.

Three years ago, Shinseki directed that the Crusader program be re-evaluated to see where it fit in with future Army forces -- resulting in major changes to the program. The Army reduced the planned Crusader procurement from more than 1,100 to 480 systems. Program costs went from $22 billion down to $11 billion. Crusader's weight was reduced from 55 to 40 tons and a 33-ton wheeled re-supply vehicle was created (38 tons in the tracked re-supply version). The Crusader program was tailored to support Army transformation. Furthermore, Crusader "survived" the strictest scrutiny as the Army terminated or restructured 29 programs over the past three years to fund Army transformation.

Russia, China, North Korea, Turkey, India, Ukraine and Iran all have a qualitatives advantage in artillery systems over the United States. Their cannon outrange or out-shoot U.S. artillery. America's most advanced howitzer, the Paladin, is based on a 40-year-old chassis. It cannot keep up with "legacy" fighting systems -- systems now in place -- like the M1 Tank or Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Crusader can shoot 10 kilometers farther than Paladin, far exceeding Paladin's rate of fire, accuracy, mobility, and speed. It is totally automated with advanced sensor to shooter systems and is crewed by three soldiers versus five for Paladin.

Crusader is accompanied by a two-man vehicle that can dock with and automatically re-arm and re-fuel the gun in 10 minutes without any of the crew having to dismount and be exposed to enemy fire. As a result, Crusader outmatches any existing cannon system in the world.

A Crusader howitzer and its resupply vehicle can both be loaded on a C-17 and flown into a battle area. Crusader's maximum speed of about 42 mph and its mobility are comparable to an M1 tank. No longer will Army formations have to slow down to allow fire support to keep up as units found themselves having to do during the Gulf War.

Analysis also shows that one Crusader has the firepower (as measured by rate of fire, accuracy, range, and responsiveness) of two Paladins.

Several arguments have been advanced on why to terminate the program.

The first is that "precision" munitions delivered by aircraft or multiple launch rocket systems can do a better and more efficient job.

These theories are offered by those who do not understand the depth of the battlefield and the absolute requirements for fire support throughout all its dimensions, including time and space. Cannon artillery can be brought in closer to friendly troops than can rockets and air-delivered bombs because of smaller probable error and smaller bursting radii. Unlike air-delivered weapons, cannon artillery is responsive 24 hours a day without regard to weather. It can destroy, suppress, obscure, and mark and do so within 60 seconds or less.

Air-delivered munitions have several advantages, but weather, timelines, and employment in close proximity (within 500 meters) to friendly troops are not among them. Missiles and rockets are excellent "area" weapons for large targets. Not so for hardened targets or for use in the immediate proximity of friendly soldiers. Efforts to put Global Positioning System fuses on rockets have been problematic, will be very expensive, and will not account for a rocket's relatively flat trajectory that renders it useless for targets in defilade.

Cannon artillery on the other hand can alter trajectory to reach enemy in defilade. Just look at the lessons the Russians learned in using cannon artillery in Grozny. The Russians used cannon to gain entry to the city as well as to press fighting within Grozny. They found that the trajectory of artillery was more effective than rockets in adjusting to hit targets in defilade, and could be used with precision close to friendly troops.

During Operation Anaconda, U.S. troops came under an intense al Qaida mortar attack and were unable to silence these mortars because the troops lacked artillery systems to provide counter fire -- and bad weather prevented use of U.S. aircraft to drop precision munitions. One Crusader prepositioned five to eight miles from the landing zone of Operation Anaconda could have been digitally linked to a counter-mortar radar and had rounds on the way to enemy mortar positions before the first al Qaida mortars were adjusted onto American soldiers.

"We could use Crusader as support for troops attacking in the mountains and get responsive artillery fire at considerable range and distance that we can't do with any of our other systems," Gen. John Keane, vice chief of staff of the Army said in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Air-Land Panel in March.

The point that is often missed by many is that cannon fire, rockets and air power are complementary -- not redundant. One system cannot do it all.

Another argument is that the U.S. Army doesn't need this "legacy" weapon - that we can wait for transformation of the military into a futuristic force that relies on near perfect knowledge of the enemy and prosecutes the war with precision weapons.

Those who do not have responsibility for the lives and well-being of soldiers between now and whenever this "transformed force" appears can "take" this risk. It is much harder for Army leaders like Shinseki and White, who have both a moral and a legal responsibility under Title X to man, equip and train America's Army to fight and win the nation's wars: today, tomorrow, and 15 years from now.

Risk in the Army is not measured in dollars but in the lives of America's sons and daughters. The courage of White and Shinseki in supporting what is best for our Army must be applauded, not condemned. As soldiers, however, they now will have to resign or salute and support Rumsfeld's decision. This will be very difficult decision since nothing has changed regarding the operational need for the new howitzer system.

Crusader development has been in progress since 1994. The Army's Future Combat System is not anticipated to be ready until at least 2010 and this does not include a fire-support derivative. A futuristic artillery system called NetFires is anticipated no earlier than 2012. Both programs in acquisition terms -- schedule and cost -- are high risk.

Crusader on the other hand already has fired more than 5,000 rounds. It is on time and on budget which is very unusual for DoD programs. The Army has sunk $2 billion into its high tech and evolutionary software and robotics. More importantly, Crusader's digitized cockpit configuration, imbedded sensor to shooter links, advanced composite armor, light metal construction, and leap-ahead automation and robotics would be a springboard for the Future Combat System and provide a robust responsive fire support bridge between the Army's legacy, interim, and objective (future) forces.

The Constitution specifically gives Congress, not the secretary of Defense, the charter to raise and maintain an Army. Congress confirms the appointment of the Army chief of staff and Army secretary based on their ability and character to make the best judgements necessary to train, man, and equip the Army to fight and win the nation's wars. Both Shinseki and White have strongly supported the Crusader program in spite of making hard decisions to cancel several other Army programs.

Congress will hold hearings on the Crusader cancellation and will ask Rumsfeld and Shinseki to testify. Is the decision to kill the Crusader

based on operational analysis or academic supposition? Is it in the best interest of our soldiers?

Crusader is a high-tech weapon that fills a critical void in the close fight on the battlefield. In the history of our country, soldiers have never let us down. As citizens we must demand that they get the best equipment available to fight and win today and tomorrow, not just 20 years from now.

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(Dennis Lewis is a retired Army colonel who served 12 years at Fort Bragg in the 82d Airborne Division and XVIIIth Airborne Corps. He is a former commander of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade (Airborne)).