Terrorism threatens environmental resource

WASHINGTON, Nov. 1 (UPI) -- An oil pipeline, water reservoir or other environmentally sensitive site could be the target of the next terrorist attack, according to a new think tank report. Analysts at several other think tanks agree.

The odds of terrorists targeting an environmental resource site are much greater than the odds of them using a weapon of mass destruction, says Elizabeth L. Chalecki, author of the report, "A New Vigilance: Identifying and Reducing the Risks of Environmental Terrorism."

The potential damage from an attack on an environmental asset could be longer lasting and more widespread than conventional bombing, says the report, published by the Pacific Institute in Oakland, Calif., which studies environmental issues.

If an oil reserve system, a water reservoir or a forest were to be attacked in the United States, it would not be the first time. Sabotaging natural resource sites has a long history, according to the report.

In July 2000, workers at the Cellatex chemical plant in northern France dumped 790 gallons of sulfuric acid into the Meuse River when they were denied health benefits.

Iraq's destruction of the Kuwaiti oil fields at the end of the 1991 Gulf War caused approximately 6 million barrels of oil to be burned per day and resulted in health and ecological problems for Kuwaitis for years afterward.

Analysts seem to agree that the United States is not adequately prepared for such attacks. That's why so many analysts are proposing new security policies, reallocation of resources, and more communication between terrorism experts on the federal, state, and local levels to effectively thwart potential terrorist attacks on environmental resources.

Unlike Chalecki, however, other think tank experts tend to focus on environmental resources not so much as targets themselves but as tools with which to spread chemical or biological agents. Water and air -- both environmental resources -- are logical counterparts to most discussions about biological and chemical attacks, especially because the alternative -- weapons of mass destruction that could also distribute such agents -- are difficult for terrorists to procure, according to several security experts.

In terms of risk, the detonation of a nuclear device or use of biological weapons in a densely populated area falls into the category of high consequence/low probability. Environmental terrorism, in comparison, has the potential to be both high consequence and high probability, says Chalecki.

Luckily, dispersing a deadly dose of a biological or chemical agent in a water supply is not easy.

"Water is not an easy tool for a terrorist (bio-chemical attack)," says Michael O'Hanlon, a security expert at the Brookings Institution. The large quantity of biological or chemical agent needed to poison an entire water supply would be difficult to dump unnoticed and could easily become too diluted to be effective, he says.

O'Hanlon points out that research shows that even effective agents dumped in the water would tend to be slow-acting, therefore not as attractive to terrorists, who tend to look for an immediate dramatic effect.

Leonard Cole, author of "The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare," agrees.

"Too many variables would have to line up exactly right," Cole says.

To cause an epidemic, says Cole, an adjunct professor of science at Rutgers University, terrorists would need simultaneously to stop a giant water filtration system, along with independent testing of contamination levels and alert systems that kick into place automatically when either of the first two events occurs. And to be effectively lethal, most contaminants require even distribution throughout the water supply, along with no rain and no sunlight, which could dilute or kill the agent, he says.

"Petroleum is slightly more worrisome," says O'Hanlon.

You may need only a rifle to put a hole in an oil pipeline above ground and then a match, or a small explosive to start something big, he says.

Someone shot a hole in a pipeline in Alaska earlier this month.

Pipelines, he adds, run in highly populated areas and are relatively difficult to protect due to the number of miles exposed in certain locations.

To reduce such risks, agencies must identify the specific environmental resource sites that terrorists could target or use as tools in future attacks, says Chalecki.

"Detection devices are key," says O'Hanlon, who also suggests rerouting pipelines in highly populated areas and putting some pipelines underground.

Reinforcing and maintaining pipelines and closing certain access roads are other possible measures.

More research and development of technologies, such as consequence management, is needed, according to analysts at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. The Arlington, Va.-based think tank has assembled researchers, technologists and policymakers to discuss issues, identify new policies, and formulate initiatives that would limit vulnerability to a bio-chemical terrorist attack.

Developing standard procedures of risk assessment and frequent communication between federal, state and local agencies is also essential, say experts from the institute.

Strengthening intelligence capabilities to get better warning of such attacks and providing more training, medical supplies, and equipment such as detection devices, protective masks and suits for local emergency workers is also essential, says Ivan Eland, director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C. This doesn't necessarily mean spending more money, according to Eland.

"The United States needs to reallocate the resources it already has," he says. "Maintaining 100,000 troops in Europe -- including an armored division in Germany to guard against an invasion by a Warsaw Pact that no longer exists, led by a Soviet Union that no longer exists -- is one example of wasted resources," he says.

"The approximately $7 billion spent to analyze weapons of mass destruction attacks may be misspent," says Chelecki, who believes a portion of this should be spent on analyzing the use of environmental resource sites as terrorist targets and tools.

"We need to think in terms of vulnerabilities and not in terms of past patterns," says Peter Singer, an Olin fellow at Brookings. "My concern is that we are spending too many resources on airline security."

Some government agencies have started to allocate funds to protect environmental resource sites. On Oct. 5, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency established a water protection task force that will help federal, state and local partners safeguard the nation's drinking water supply from terrorist attack.

In addition, the U.S. Department of Agriculture recently allotted $39.8 million to examine the devastating effects of agroterrorism on human health, the environment, and the economy. Agroterrorism would be an attack on livestock, poultry, or crops using a fungus, bacteria, virus, or insect pest in order to cause a disease outbreak that would drive food prices up, halt valuable exports, and cost taxpayers billions of dollars in lost revenue and industry renewal costs.