WASHINGTON, Oct. 9 (UPI) -- From the early 1980s on, U.S. Sen. Gordon Humphrey served as a point man for the Reagan administration's efforts to support anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan. Through this, he became well acquainted with many of the groups and issues that are once again at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. A former airline pilot, he was elected to the Senate in 1978 -- on his first ever run for elective office. He served for two terms, retiring in 1990, before returning home to the Granite State. Since leaving Washington, he has been a member of the state senate and his party's candidate for governor. He is again seeking the GOP gubernatorial nomination for 2002. Sen. Humphrey shared his views on the current situation in Afghanistan with UPI National Political Analyst Peter Roff:
Question: How did the world get to the point it as at regarding Afghanistan? What is the brief, encapsulated version of events?
Answer: Well, it's easy to capsulize. We did almost everything right between when we first began aiding the Afghan freedom fighters in the early 80s right up until 1988. Even though the Soviets were probably going to withdraw --- as they did in 1989 --- the CIA failed to adapt to these changing circumstances and insure that our assistance was only going to the more moderate groups (within the resistance) as opposed to the entire coalition of Afghan freedom fighters.
Q: What was the structure of the coalition?
A. Let me defer that for a second. There is another important (part of the) response to your first question. We did very well until about 1988. In the period 1988 to 1989, we failed because the CIA didn't begin to anticipate the end game, if you will. And then, from 1989 onward, we did abysmally because when the Soviets left, so did we. We just walked out the door and left a country that had been left in ruins by the Soviets -- whose occupation was just brutal. They caused the deaths of about one million people out of a total population of about 23 million at the time. We just walked out and left, not only a country in desolation and desperate poverty, but a political vacuum and, under those circumstance, its not surprising that ultimately -- after a struggle of two or three years -- the worst possible group came to power.
Q. That would be the Taliban?
A. Yes. We did very well aiding the freedom fighters. We didn't do terribly well in the last year because the CIA didn't begin to anticipate the end game and tailor its support to only the more moderate groups. And then we did abysmally, tragically, when we just walked out and left a vacuum that only the most ruthless group could be expected to fill.
Q. What was, pre-1988, the structure of the coalition of anti-Soviet resistance fighters?
A. It was a diverse coalition, split along tribal lines, but pretty cohesive. Then, as the Soviets left, the reason for the cohesion disappeared. They began fighting among themselves. There was a coalition government that took over. The Soviet puppet government -- which is truly what it was -- they set up this.
Q. Under Najibullah?
A. Yes -- he was the secret police chief prior to his being elevated by the Soviets to a position where he was running the country. That government actually survived for two or three years because the Soviets had practically a daily airlift of military and other kinds of assistance. I probably should not have said the Soviets walked out (in 1989). They did withdraw their troops, so they walked out in that sense, but they continued supporting Najibullah for two or three years with a heavy airlift while our side -- the freedom fighters -- were left to their own devices.
Ultimately, they did manage to form a coalition government and Najibullah was not only ousted but lynched and dragged through the streets. That coalition lasted for two or three years and then the Taliban took over in 1986.
Q. You took the lead in the U.S. Senate on making sure the coalition had the military technology -- like Stinger missiles -- necessary.
A. They had an abundance of conventional weaponry and yes, they had Stinger missiles.
Q. Knowing what they were given, are you concerned now that material may end up being used against the United States or allied military personnel?
A. They have gotten so much Russian and former Soviet material that it is hard to tell which is left over from our assistance and which is not. Of course, the singular item is the Stinger but bear in mind that we stopped supplying them to the resistance around 1988. Even if they were brand new at the time, which they might or might not have been, they are now 13 years old. I think it is unlikely that they are operational or, if they are, that they are accurate at this point. They are very sophisticated and it is not likely they have had the care that they would have needed. Furthermore, there are internal batteries and things that would have been depleted. But it's still a concern.
It's possible that some of them are useable, but there is such a mix of Soviet shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons that the danger, whether it is from Stingers or Soviet -- or since then Russian for, as we know, the Russians have been pretty careless or at least ineffective in monitoring and providing security for their stock of weaponry --- that it is quite likely that there is non-U.S. equipment present as well. There is a concern, to the extent that U.S. or allied aircraft have to trade altitude for accuracy. So far, it appears that they haven't -- even the cargo planes are dropping their stuff from 30,000 feet -- but it's still a concern.
At the same time, let's go forward. There are some who say, "Aha, we should never have helped these freedom fighters with anything." Okay, so let's apply that rigid standard going forward. We can't fight the Taliban unless we associate ourselves exclusively with boy scouts.
Let me begin by pointing out that Uzbekistan is hardly an example of a free and democratic government that adheres to a high standard of human rights. It isn't. (President Islam)Karimov is no idealist or model of western liberal thought and yet we are very thankful right now that Uzbekistan is providing material assistance to us; likewise Pakistan, which is essentially a military dictatorship at this moment. Those who say we should never have added the Afghans are essential implying that we can't win the war against terrorism either except by working with boy scouts -- that means we can't win it. It is important to be realistic about all this.
Q. The Soviets invaded in 1979 and were there for 10 years and destroyed Afghanistan and, to some degree, their own government in Moscow. Is the United States, by choosing to take on terrorists in Afghanistan, opening itself up to a similar kind of long-term commitment that is going to bog down as well?
A. I don't think so because, first of all, weaponry is a lot more sophisticated and used in stand off fashion. More importantly, I can conceive of now reason for any large-scale conventional ground operations. Anything greater than commando insertions by helicopter or C-130 or other aircraft, Special Forces, Rangers etc., there is just no conceivable reason to do what the Soviets did or the British a century earlier; to insert large numbers of conventional ground forces. That would be a dreadful mistake on our part and I am sure we are not going to do it because it simply isn't necessary.
Q. There is an operation theory in place that, given enough allied military pressure, the Taliban can be destabilized and the Northern Alliance could sweep them out, restoring some kind of coalition government in Kabul. What would a successful coalition look like and is such a coalition even a realistic possibility
A. Let me say first of all, it's the only option -- and it must truly be a coalition that involves not only the Northern Alliance, which is principally Tajik, Turkic and Hazara, but it must also include a major element of Pashtun which is the majority ethnic tribal group.
If it does not, it won't have the support of the people and, furthermore, would be destabilizing towards Pakistan. Just think if some sort of Taliban-like government came to power in Pakistan -- good gosh -- with nuclear weapons and a burning antagonism towards India, anything could happen. This is a very delicate operation, trying to create a real coalition government in Afghanistan. Just aiding the Northern Alliance, while necessary, is far from enough. We need to involve Pashtuns, ultimately, in a coalition government.
It all points out that we need to be using our brains as much or more as our brawn. Right now, it is necessary to go in there and reduce the Taliban's defensive capability and, ultimately, go in there and haul bin Laden out of a cave but ultimately we are going to win this with our brains. We have to engage in an information war, we need to win the hearts and minds of the ordinary people in Islamic nations and encourage them to overthrow these despots who harbor terrorists around the world. It is going to be a long, drawn out, and complex effort.
