WASHINGTON, July 18 (UPI) -- The war between the Colombian state and the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, is not a Fourth Generation war conflict, because it is fought within the framework of the state. The Colombian government seeks to maintain control of the state, while FARC wants to replace it. It's all about who runs the state, not offering alternatives to the state.
Nonetheless, some lessons for 4GW may be drawn, because the way in which the war is fought -- a guerrilla-style insurgency -- is similar to many (not all) Fourth Generation conflicts. The recent successful rescue of hostages long held by FARC is a case in point. It was a brilliant victory for the Colombian government and armed forces on all levels, including the moral level. What might the U.S. Armed Forces learn from it that they could apply in Iraq, Afghanistan and, we fear, elsewhere?
First, it illustrated the advantage that mental cleverness has over brute firepower. The Colombians' previous foray, the aerial bombing of a FARC camp in Ecuador, blew up in their faces. In contrast, the hostage rescue made the Colombians look both brave and smart, and FARC appear to be the Three Stooges. FARC was not bombed or blown up, it was outsmarted. It has no martyrs to offer the public or its supporters, just its clownish face covered in pie. FARC was made a laughingstock, which is the worst blow that can be inflicted upon any political organization.
Second, the combination of outsmarting FARC with the fact that no one on either side was hurt, much less killed, allows this action to count as an unqualified victory, a rarity in this kind of war. Usually, a victory at the physical level generates blowback on the mental and moral level. Not here. It was a real triple-play. The fact that the testimony of the rescued hostages made FARC, not the government forces, into the bully adds to the score.
Third, the operation was a strategic success because it was a Colombian, not an American, operation. Had American forces gone in and done exactly the same thing, the action would have made the Colombian government look weak, not strong. It would have undermined rather than strengthened its legitimacy. Most Latin Americans would have seen the rescue as one more humiliation of fellow Hispanics by the North Americans, and they would have identified with FARC rather than laughing at it.