Some background explanation is needed. When I visited Tehran last May -- before Ahmadinejad was elected or anyone I spoke to thought he would be -- Central Asia was very much on the minds of Iranian scholars, diplomats, and clerics. Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution," which had ousted an autocratic ruler and brought to power a new government espousing democracy, had occurred in March. Further, the violent crackdown by the Uzbek government against its (mainly unarmed) opponents in Andijon had occurred just a few days prior to my arrival in Tehran.
Central Asia, I was told, was a sensitive subject in Iran. The Iranian government opposed democratic revolutions there not only because the United States was seen as causing and benefiting from them, but also because the Iranian government feared that it would be overthrown in a similar manner. Yet Tehran did not want to see Islamic Revolution in Central Asia either since this would bring to power radical Sunnis similar to the Taliban who were as anti-Shia and anti-Iranian as they were anti-Western. Leaving the current ex-communist dictators in place, then, was seen as the least worst option for Iran. But it was one the Iranians I spoke to were uncomfortable with since they saw Central Asia's leaders -- especially Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov -- as brutal dictators whose actions were leading their countries toward instability.
With this in mind, let us now turn to Ahmadinejad's policy toward Central Asia. How he and his administration view this subject was made clear in early November at the annual Iranian conference on Central Asia and the Caucasus put on by Tehran's Institute for Political and International Studies -- a research institute linked to the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
Ahmadinejad himself gave the conference's inaugural address, thus indicating the importance of the subject to him. Although he has never shied away from declaring himself an enemy of America and Israel, he appeared anxious here to portray himself as a friend to post-Soviet secular authoritarian rulers. "The Islamic Republic," he stated, "has a friendly view of Central Asian and Caucasus countries and strongly believes in peace and mutual coexistence."
Ali Larijani (Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council) emphasized how the American push for democratization was a common threat to them. According to IRNA, The Iranian news agency, he said that, "public opinion in the region regards the U.S. as a trouble maker in the region. The doctrine of a larger Middle East calling for establishing democracy in the region is one means for escalating tension in the Middle East."
From these as well as other Iranian press accounts, it is clear that Ahmadinejad has no intention of attempting to foment Islamic revolution in Central Asia. Instead, he sees Central Asian leaders' fear of American efforts to promote democratization as an opportunity for Iran. For not only will Central Asian leaders who fear America seek to reduce its role in the region, they will have no incentive to cooperate with Washington against Tehran -- provided they do not see Iran as a threat. And Ahmadinejad is clearly doing all he can to assure the dictators of Central Asia that, unlike America, he is not a threat to them.
What this shows is that Ahmadinejad is more of a pragmatist than he is usually given credit for. He can ally with secular, even anti-Islamic dictators (as the ex-communist rulers of Central Asia all are) when he sees it in his interest to do so. And unlike the Iranians I spoke to in May, he does not appear to feel at all uncomfortable about Tehran doing this.
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Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University.