-
Indian police get jungle warfare training
Published: May 16, 2008 at 10:16 PM
NEW DELHI, May 16 (UPI) -- India has asked its state governments to provide jungle warfare training to its police personnel to counter Maoist insurgents. -
DHS announces IPA grants
Published: May 16, 2008 at 10:13 PM
WASHINGTON, May 16 (UPI) -- Grants to aid cities in the event of terrorist attacks or natural disasters were announced Friday by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. -
Record year against organized crime
Published: May 16, 2008 at 10:12 PM
LONDON, May 16 (UPI) -- British officials say 2007-2008 was a record year in the war on drugs, according to an annual report by the Serious Organized Crime Agency.
-
Iraq Press Roundup
Published: May 16, 2008 at 9:16 PM
By HIBA DAWOOD
UPI Correspondent
The daily Al Sabaah newspaper said Friday in its editorial that observers of the political process in Iraq today cannot illustrate it or acknowledge its aims or intentions, which turns the process of analyzing it into something close to a guessing game. -
German industry targeted by Russian spies
Published: May 16, 2008 at 8:56 PM
By STEFAN NICOLA
UPI Germany Correspondent
BERLIN, May 16 (UPI) -- The German government has accused foreign intelligence services -- blaming mainly Russian agents -- of having spied on German companies. -
Feature: U.S. cites attacks despite truce
Published: May 16, 2008 at 2:34 PM
By RICHARD TOMKINS
BAGHDAD, May 13 (UPI) -- A new cease-fire has been declared between the Iraqi government and Shiite gunmen of radical cleric Moqtada Sadr, but U.S. and Iraqi forces say their troops are still coming under attack in Sadr City. -
Dogs of War: Blackwater, Najaf -- Take Two
Published: May 16, 2008 at 10:28 AM
By DAVID ISENBERG
WASHINGTON, May 16 (UPI) -- One aspect of private military and security contractors that is relatively ignored is their relationship with regular military forces. Such discussion, as there is, is generally limited to sound bites about the reported envy that soldiers have for allegedly better paid security contractors. -
Analysis: Indian agencies start blame game
Published: May 15, 2008 at 8:36 PM
By KUSHAL JEENA
UPI Correspondent
NEW DELHI, May 15 (UPI) -- India's intelligence and security agencies are indulging in a blame game over a recent foiled infiltration bid by militants on the Pakistani border, with one agency accusing the paramilitary forces guarding the border of lacking alertness. -
Iraq press roundup
Published: May 15, 2008 at 7:20 PM
By HIBA DAWOOD
UPI Correspondent
The daily Al Mashriq newspaper had an editorial Thursday titled "Last lines for the chaotic months" that said although Iraq has been in a war for five years, the government in the last few weeks has been chaotically carrying out quick military operations and offensives in many cities and areas around the country.
Latest Headlines
Most Popular
Analysis: A hornet's nest in Basra
Published: April 21, 2008 at 11:08 AM
By DANIEL GRAEBER
WASHINGTON, April 21 (UPI) -- The United States attributes the latest conflicts in Basra to Iranian meddling and the continued activity of al-Qaida forces, but the reality on the ground suggests it is a violent manifestation of the political culture in Iraq.
In late 2006 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad warned that the various Iraqi political factions might shed blood before they understand the benefits of reconciliation. Speaking in Washington recently, the top commander in Iraq U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus said, "The fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq is a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources." With the U.S. military reporting operations in Basra moving to a clear and hold phase, the future may show that as U.S. forces turn control of security over to the Iraqis, violence between rival political factions could shape the new threat environment.
In 2008 representatives from the Sadrist Movement, the party loyal to Moqtada Sadr, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council reached a formal agreement to ease their rivalry, though not much came of the move. In January Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a proposal to the Sadrist Movement inviting it back to the central government after a long boycott. This was a good political moment for Sadr. As Maliki was busy calling the Sadrists an "essential cornerstone … in the new Iraq," Sadr knew he could always return to the gun if the political fight stalled.
Wayne White, who led the State Department's Iraq intelligence team during 2003-2005, said a key point between the Maliki government and Sadr was his support for Maliki in 2005 for the premiership.
"Subsequently," White said, "Maliki was rather protective of Sadr, for quite some time literally needing the support of Sadr and Sadr's people in the Iraqi Council of Representatives to stay in power."
White said U.S. officials, however, pressured Maliki to distance himself from Sadr. Meanwhile, the United States also pushed Sadr's rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SIIC, to move closer to Maliki to push Sadr out of Iraqi politics.
"At some point," White adds, "Maliki and Sadr had a falling out, mainly because of U.S. pressure on Maliki to distance himself and his government from this brash, ambitious and anti-American cleric and his violent Mahdi Army and U.S. pressure on Sadr rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to support Maliki in order to supplant Sadr."
Hakim began to worry about the Sadrist influence in the Shiite south as most of Sadr's group fled to Basra shortly after the U.S. troop surge. Hakim saw his influence in the Maliki government as an opportunity to take more control over Basra and its key oil reserves. In March U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney met with Hakim for several hours outside of the Green Zone. Hakim emerged saying he saw eye to eye with Cheney on security issues.
The day after Cheney's visit with Hakim, a reconciliation conference in Baghdad failed from the start as Sadrist representatives stormed out of the meeting over complaints of marginalization in Parliament. The following day, March 19, under intense U.S. pressure, the three-member presidency council approved a slate of laws, including one that paved the way for October provincial elections, after Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of SIIC lifted his objection.
As Cheney left Baghdad for Washington, Maliki left for Basra to oversee security operations. Sadr loyalists at this point held many of the key positions in the south because of dissatisfaction with Hakim loyalists there. Maliki decided it was time to show the world that Iraqi security forces could lead an assault without the help of the U.S. military and took on the militias in Basra.
A June 2007 report by the International Crisis Group describes Basra as the de facto economic capital of Iraq because of its port access and oil reserves. The SIIC wanted to control Basra from Baghdad, while the Sadrists were happy to control things from the streets. Hakim was not on good terms with the Sadrists, accusing the group of assassinating SIIC governors in August 2007 and his own brother, Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, in 2003. The conflict in Basra in late March 2008 put Hakim and Maliki against Sadr, and the political arena became a bloody battle for control.
Maliki understands his government is rife with corruption and suffers from incompetence, so he sees his battle with Sadr as an opportunity to boost legitimacy in Baghdad.
"Maliki might have wanted to demonstrate that he could act on his own without (the U.S. military) in a show of strength. If so, it backfired," White said.
The conflict in Basra was largely a political move, setting the stage for the October elections. Meanwhile, Iran is seeing the unraveling of the Shiite blocs in Iraq, and with no clear winner coming out of Basra, Tehran is backing every horse in the race. Despite a variety of political conflicts underneath the surface of the Basra conflict, it is the upcoming provincial elections that dominate the Shiite row.
With Maliki limping back to Baghdad, his perception that he could emerge as an able leader dissolved. It appears he is at the mercy of Tehran and, closer to home, the SIIC and Hakim. Beyond that, both leaders must answer to Iran before they answer to the United States. The United States, meanwhile, depends on the cooperation of the SIIC and Maliki to get things done. If the Bush administration sought to contain Iran by moving into Tehran's back yard, it did so by stirring a hornet's nest.
WASHINGTON, April 21 (UPI) -- The United States attributes the latest conflicts in Basra to Iranian meddling and the continued activity of al-Qaida forces, but the reality on the ground suggests it is a violent manifestation of the political culture in Iraq.
In late 2006 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad warned that the various Iraqi political factions might shed blood before they understand the benefits of reconciliation. Speaking in Washington recently, the top commander in Iraq U.S. Army Gen. David Petraeus said, "The fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq is a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources." With the U.S. military reporting operations in Basra moving to a clear and hold phase, the future may show that as U.S. forces turn control of security over to the Iraqis, violence between rival political factions could shape the new threat environment.
In 2008 representatives from the Sadrist Movement, the party loyal to Moqtada Sadr, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council reached a formal agreement to ease their rivalry, though not much came of the move. In January Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki sent a proposal to the Sadrist Movement inviting it back to the central government after a long boycott. This was a good political moment for Sadr. As Maliki was busy calling the Sadrists an "essential cornerstone … in the new Iraq," Sadr knew he could always return to the gun if the political fight stalled.
Wayne White, who led the State Department's Iraq intelligence team during 2003-2005, said a key point between the Maliki government and Sadr was his support for Maliki in 2005 for the premiership.
"Subsequently," White said, "Maliki was rather protective of Sadr, for quite some time literally needing the support of Sadr and Sadr's people in the Iraqi Council of Representatives to stay in power."
White said U.S. officials, however, pressured Maliki to distance himself from Sadr. Meanwhile, the United States also pushed Sadr's rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SIIC, to move closer to Maliki to push Sadr out of Iraqi politics.
"At some point," White adds, "Maliki and Sadr had a falling out, mainly because of U.S. pressure on Maliki to distance himself and his government from this brash, ambitious and anti-American cleric and his violent Mahdi Army and U.S. pressure on Sadr rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim to support Maliki in order to supplant Sadr."
Hakim began to worry about the Sadrist influence in the Shiite south as most of Sadr's group fled to Basra shortly after the U.S. troop surge. Hakim saw his influence in the Maliki government as an opportunity to take more control over Basra and its key oil reserves. In March U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney met with Hakim for several hours outside of the Green Zone. Hakim emerged saying he saw eye to eye with Cheney on security issues.
The day after Cheney's visit with Hakim, a reconciliation conference in Baghdad failed from the start as Sadrist representatives stormed out of the meeting over complaints of marginalization in Parliament. The following day, March 19, under intense U.S. pressure, the three-member presidency council approved a slate of laws, including one that paved the way for October provincial elections, after Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi of SIIC lifted his objection.
As Cheney left Baghdad for Washington, Maliki left for Basra to oversee security operations. Sadr loyalists at this point held many of the key positions in the south because of dissatisfaction with Hakim loyalists there. Maliki decided it was time to show the world that Iraqi security forces could lead an assault without the help of the U.S. military and took on the militias in Basra.
A June 2007 report by the International Crisis Group describes Basra as the de facto economic capital of Iraq because of its port access and oil reserves. The SIIC wanted to control Basra from Baghdad, while the Sadrists were happy to control things from the streets. Hakim was not on good terms with the Sadrists, accusing the group of assassinating SIIC governors in August 2007 and his own brother, Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, in 2003. The conflict in Basra in late March 2008 put Hakim and Maliki against Sadr, and the political arena became a bloody battle for control.
Maliki understands his government is rife with corruption and suffers from incompetence, so he sees his battle with Sadr as an opportunity to boost legitimacy in Baghdad.
"Maliki might have wanted to demonstrate that he could act on his own without (the U.S. military) in a show of strength. If so, it backfired," White said.
The conflict in Basra was largely a political move, setting the stage for the October elections. Meanwhile, Iran is seeing the unraveling of the Shiite blocs in Iraq, and with no clear winner coming out of Basra, Tehran is backing every horse in the race. Despite a variety of political conflicts underneath the surface of the Basra conflict, it is the upcoming provincial elections that dominate the Shiite row.
With Maliki limping back to Baghdad, his perception that he could emerge as an able leader dissolved. It appears he is at the mercy of Tehran and, closer to home, the SIIC and Hakim. Beyond that, both leaders must answer to Iran before they answer to the United States. The United States, meanwhile, depends on the cooperation of the SIIC and Maliki to get things done. If the Bush administration sought to contain Iran by moving into Tehran's back yard, it did so by stirring a hornet's nest.
© 2008 United Press International. All Rights Reserved.
This material may not be reproduced, redistributed, or manipulated in any form.
This material may not be reproduced, redistributed, or manipulated in any form.
» Next in Emerging Threats - Analysis:
Iraq Press Roundup