LOS ANGELES, Sept. 18 (UPI) -- Moscow's brutal military action to bring Tbilisi to heel should not excuse Georgia's own use of force to reassert control over South Ossetia. Clearly the Georgians learned little from recent history: In today's world, countries that attempt to hold on to rebellious provinces with longstanding grievances risk a long, bloody resistance and/or outside intervention by more powerful opponents.
This begs the question, not only in the Transcaucasus but elsewhere: Is letting go the better course? The cumulative evidence since World War II suggests that ethnic or national groups that cannot live together are better off living apart. Successful application of this principle to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict not only would resolve this confounding thorn but also would encourage resolution of struggles elsewhere.
South Ossetia's claim to autonomy or more springs not simply from its own history but from international convention and practice. In 1945 the U.N. Charter laid the foundation, promoting the "self-determination of peoples." In the early years this encouraged the ethno-religious partition of colonies.
The division of British Palestine and India marked two results. However, by 1960 the General Assembly stepped back. In its landmark decolonization Resolution 1514 it called the "disruption of national unity and the territorial integrity of a country ... incompatible" with the Charter. And, because the Charter excluded U.N. intervention into matters of domestic jurisdiction, this left populations that could not integrate politically out on a limb.
No matter. Rather than live with the unacceptable, many revolted. Some governments crushed rebellions -- the fate of Biafrans and Chechens. Others, after long-hurting stalemates, reached power-sharing agreements -- the denouement of Northern Ireland's long "Troubles." Then there were the partitions, often after bitter conflicts, that gave birth to Bangladesh, new Balkan states, divided Cyprus, Eritrea and Timor-Leste -- the first three instances midwifed by India, the United States and Turkey, respectively.
Russia's military action and recognition of South Ossetia repeats the history of interventionist partition. And while this has generated the outrage of Tbilisi and the West, South Ossetia has a legitimate claim to self-determination as envisioned under the U.N. Charter. An ethnically defined region that Czarist Russia annexed in 1801, the territory fell under Soviet Georgian administration following the Russian Revolution. Ossetians continued to promote their cultural identity, and, with the end of the Soviet Union looming, their regional council petitioned Georgia's Supreme Council to become an "autonomous republic." The 1991 denial inspired civil conflict resulting in nearly 1,000 deaths and displacement of thousands who took refuge in Georgia and the Russian republic of North Ossetia.
The following decade saw a peacekeeping force of Ossetians, Russians and Georgians, monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, maintain the peace. But as the years passed, so did Georgia's dissatisfaction with Moscow's growing influence over the province, rising South Ossetian nationalism punctuated by sporadic border violence. Tbilisi mounted a political campaign to get European and American support to regain control over the province, but the efforts failed to generate tangible results, laying the ground for current events.
Georgia could have avoided its travail had it learned from recent European experience that letting go is something countries can adjust to. Serbia's assent to Montenegro's 2006 exit from their union, the 1993 dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the breakup of the Soviet Union, which opened the door to Georgia's own independence, provide examples.
Despite the opportunity lost to peacefully resolve South Ossetia's drive for more secure autonomy, Georgia can still salvage regional settlement by taking a leaf from what other war-torn regions promise through the ballot box.
Following bloody civil wars with Sudan and Papua New Guinea, Southern Sudan and Bougainville, respectively, achieved autonomy with the promise to settle final status through referenda. Tbilisi should concede the same. A vote managed and legitimized by the OSCE -- the international community refused to endorse a 2006 South Ossetian nationalist referendum for independence -- would permit the population to decide among four options: reintegration into Georgia, semiautonomy, independence or union with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation. In the likely case of endorsement of partition, agreement should grant ethnic Georgians the option to resettle in Georgia proper. Prior to the election, U.N. peacekeepers could replace Russian forces to keep law and order.
The proposed settlement brings at least one other advantage: Successful, it could encourage other regions that risk or confront even more difficult strife today to follow suit. Sri Lanka, Indian Kashmir, Israel/Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Sudan/Darfur, Moros/Philippines, Iraq/Kurdistan, China/Taiwan and China/Tibet could well be the beneficiaries.
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(Bennett Ramberg served in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department of State in the George H.W. Bush administration. His academic articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.)
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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
