WASHINGTON, June 18 (UPI) -- To make the U.S. Air Force more relevant to the military's new counterinsurgency mission, experts say, the new leadership of the service has to "reinvent itself," look for alternatives to high-cost, high-tech, fuel-guzzling aircraft, and break out of its decades-long planning and procurement cycle to become a more agile, diverse force.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates last week broke the mold in at least one regard by naming as USAF chief of staff a transport pilot -- the first non-fighter, non-bomber pilot ever to head the service -- after firing the incumbent, along with the Air Force secretary, earlier this month.
Gates recently chastised all the services for what he called "Next-war-itis" -- "the propensity of much of the defense establishment to be in favor of (acquiring) what might be needed in a future conflict" rather than focusing on what is required to win the war they are actually fighting now and are most likely to face in the coming years.
"To remain viable," he said, the military's major weapons programs "will have to show some utility and relevance to the kind of irregular campaigns that … are most likely to engage America's military in the coming decades."
The Air Force's defenders say purchasing now for the next conflict is a necessity when new aircraft can take more than a decade to plan, develop and produce.
"Secretary Gates has accused the Air Force … of planning for the next war, but that is what you have to do with air forces because you cannot produce the aircraft needed when you need them," said retired Air Force Gen. Michael Dunn, president of the Air Force Association.
Retired Air Force Col. Chester Richards, who has studied and written about military strategy for three decades, told UPI the leadership changes were an opportunity for the service to "reinvent itself … to stay relevant in those kinds of (irregular and asymmetric) conflicts."
"They have been trying," he said, noting the service's forays into non-conventional areas such as cyberwarfare. But he said the new leadership will "inherit these huge procurement programs (like the F-22 Raptor and the yet-to-be built F-35 Joint Strike Fighter) … with their own momentum."
Richards believes the service will have a hard time justifying the cost in terms of counterinsurgency capabilities, and other observers say the Air Force -- and the military as a whole -- may face a budgetary crunch when the practice of funding through special emergency supplemental appropriations ends next year.
"The procurement priorities of the department are not well orientated towards the current conflict," a senior congressional staffer told UPI. "Does that mean some of the things that have been (USAF procurement) priorities will not get funded? Probably so."
But he added that the Air Force historically has been successful at getting Congress to fund its priorities and "has done a lot better (on the F-22 and F-35) than the Army has with (its huge-ticket procurement program, the Future Combat System, or) FCS."
Lt. Col Michael Pietrucha, a specialist in irregular combat who until recently worked at the Air Force Warfare Center, told UPI that, in 1965, when the North Vietnamese army began using surface-to-air missiles against U.S. aircraft, the Air Force was able to field a newly configured aircraft, fitted with electronic countermeasures and seating for an operator, within months.
"In the past, we adapted quicker," said Pietrucha, who stressed he did not speak for the service. He blamed "a much smaller, less diverse force" and the proliferation of acquisition regulations for the loss of flexibility.
"Not everything needs to take 20 years," he said. "We need to depart from the plan," he said, and break out of the planning and budget cycle that created "such long lead times" in procurement.
It is "a legitimate criticism" to say the Air Force, like most large organizations, has "not adapted quickly enough to the new challenges" of counterinsurgency.
Air Force spokeswoman Maj. Olivia Nelson told UPI the service was "focused and proactive in acquiring and using new systems that are needed in our fight now," giving as an example the new Wide Area Airborne Surveillance System and other high-technology tools being developed for the collection and analysis of intelligence.
Pietrucha cautioned that in the future, the Air Force would "need to think right-tech rather than high-tech," pointing to the enormous success of the A-10 -- a gunship considered lumbering and inelegant by some.
Skyrocketing fuel prices are imposing "a huge logistics penalty" on the service, Pietrucha said, noting relatively low-tech solutions like the A-10 are "cheaper to build and more economical to employ."
"You need a high-low mix" of technology, he said, adding, "Our capabilities are really in our people."
He said the service also needed to "better utilize our unconventional thinkers." At the moment, he said, it was "too easy to be slapped down and spoil your career" by thinking "out of the box."
Nurturing such mavericks would be "sometimes a bit painful and sometimes a bit embarrassing, but we can take a little of that at the individual level to help us avoid it at the national one."
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Next: The Air Force's record on unmanned surveillance aircraft and partnership building.
