The paper said that in strategic planning, there is a chance of a calculated risk being taken when the strategic interests of a country are at stake.
"Thus, the United States insisted it was keen on containing Iraq," the paper said.
"Saddam's regime has failed in realizing the consequences of a calculated risk based on a deceptive strategy that made simple as well as high-ranking people think Saddam owned enough weapons of mass destruction to respond to U.S. attacks," the paper said.
It said the United States used this strategy to present to the Security Council intelligence reports to "prove" that Saddam had WMD. The paper said it was unclear if the United States would have attacked Iraq even if Saddam had responded to its demands.
The paper said Saddam's strategy provided an answer to many governments -- especially those that were dictatorships that fail to get out of crises with their people, their region or with global powers. It said the invasion of Iraq served not only U.S. interests but also the interests of other regional countries.
It said Saddam predicted that global power had retreated once the Soviet Union fell.
It said the U.S. invasion of Iraq was the central point Washington used as an excuse for its plans to contain Iraq.
"Although the U.S. evicted Iraq by military force from Kuwait, it gave Iraq's government the light to stay in power," the paper said.
It also said Saddam's government failed in 14 out of 198 provinces.
"The other four provinces feared Saddam's previous power containing the Shiites cities in the south and the north as well as the Kurds," it said.
The paper said that Saddam's full control and suppression of the south and north of Iraq granted the United States another excuse to target the regime in Iraq.
"Reaching the target," the paper commented, "the U.S. used the same Iraqi figures affected during 1991 to fulfill its goal."
The paper said Iraqi strategic planners have the responsibility to realize Iraq's strengths and weaknesses that affect relations with the United States.