BRUSSELS, Dec. 28 (UPI) -- Looking back over the European Union's record as security actor in 2007, two things stand out. The year will be remembered for the Lisbon Treaty, which, once ratified by the 27 member states, holds the promise of making the EU more activist and outward-looking.

But the year will also be remembered by continued intra-EU squabbling over key security challenges like Kosovo, Chad, Afghanistan and the continued inability to match the bloc's aims with resources and manpower. Against expectations, only EU support for the U.N. Lebanon mission seems trouble-free.

The Lisbon Treaty tries to streamline the EU's institutions -- designed in 1956 -- in order to support service for the bloc of 27 members.

The new treaty beefs up the role of the "High Representative for External Affairs" -- the EU foreign minister -- who would also become a vice president of the European Commission. This person would chair meetings of European foreign ministers and lead an "External Action Service," an EU diplomatic corps.

With these changes, the EU's aid budget will be able to dovetail political priorities, and foreign governments will met one EU interface, not several institutions each with its own agenda. EU military missions will also be able to work more closely with their civilian colleagues.

But as the treaty will make improvements to the EU's setup, problems with current operations show how far the EU has to go to become a credible foreign policy actor. In 2007 the EU's three main missions -- in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad -- all suffered from serious shortfalls in equipment, personnel or materiel.

In what will become the EU's flagship operation, the follow-on Rule of Law mission to the 8-year-old U.N. mission in Kosovo, the EU has benefited from the longest and most comprehensive planning process it has ever undertaken.

The EU has worked hand-in-glove with the United States, and it now looks likely that Kosovo will receive some form of "conditional independence" in 2008. Yet problems recruiting the 1,800 police officers and prosecutors for the mission now risks undermining implementation.

The same problem is plaguing the EU's putative mission to Chad, which was meant to stop any spillover from the conflict in Darfur. While Ireland and Poland have offered troops, the number of helicopters pledged has been zero. Without air assets, it will not be possible to deploy a robust operation. The paucity is odd, for, as British Foreign Secretary David Miliband pointed out in November, "EU countries have around 1,200 transport helicopters, yet only about 35 are deployed in Afghanistan."

In Afghanistan, the EU's effort looks more impressive. Troops from the EU account for more than half of ISAF's total deployment of 35,500 soldiers. EU states command of a third of all Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Together with the European Commission, EU states have paid for a third of the country's reconstruction.

But despite this, EU support for the mission is in reality limited, and cooperation between its various elements remains inadequate.

The total European troop contribution falls well short of the 17,000 U.S. troops deployed with ISAF and its 8,000 Coalition Force troops outside of NATO.

In the vital areas of policing, rule of law and counter-narcotics, EU member states have pursued policies independently of each other.

Finally, the European Commission's development assistance to Afghanistan is falling this year, from 200 million euros a year to 150 million euros a year. This has contributed to the problems in Afghanistan's reconstruction.

In all three missions, the EU's intentions have not been matched by its capabilities and concerted follow-through. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, once ratified by the 27 EU countries, will begin the much-needed process of rationing the EU's foreign policy apparatus.

But to become a more effective security actor in 2008, the bloc will need to invest in a range of civilian and military capabilities and ensure that the three missions -- in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Chad -- are well-resourced. The EU cannot hope to become a global player by fighting on the cheap.

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(Daniel Korski is a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Until earlier this year, he was a senior British official and head of the U.K. Provincial Reconstruction Team in Basra, Iraq.)