WASHINGTON, Sept. 27 (UPI) -- Here we go again. France under President Nicolas Sarkozy has again signaled its readiness to rejoin the unified military command of the NATO alliance, which it left in 1966.
France last proposed this 10 years ago under Sarkozy’s predecessor, President Jacques Chirac. But negotiations stalled over France’s demand it be rewarded with the Mediterranean command, which would have meant a French admiral (or general) being put at least nominally in charge of NATO assets in the region, which would have included the U.S. sixth Fleet. This, for the Americans, was unacceptable.
The same hurdle must now be faced again. Sarkozy has put two conditions on his country’s proposal to rejoin NATO as a full member. There is some sophistry here. France rejoined NATO’s military committee in 1995, and French troops routinely train with NATO forces, took part in military operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and the French army has also adopted NATO’s common procedures. But Sarkozy’s offer contains more than meets the eye.
"I would make progress on a European defense a condition for moving into the integrated command, and I am asking our American friends to understand that," Sarkozy said. "A Europe capable of defending itself independently would not be a risk for the Americans; it would be an asset.
"It is obvious that if we were to envisage such a move, it could only happen in as much as space was made in the leadership, at the highest level, for representatives of France," he said.
That means the vexed issue of a French command has been revived. The British, logically enough through geography, have the command of the western approaches to Europe, though the United States keeps the command of the Atlantic as a whole. The Germans have the main land-based command in Europe, though the supreme commander is always an American. No doubt some sort of command could be carved out for France, but without offending Italy or Spain, it might be difficult to define something of more than symbolic importance.
And Sarkozy’s second condition, of progress on Europe’s own defense identity, is equally problematic, since the United States has long suspected that a European defense system separate from NATO would be at worst a way of easing the Americans out of the trans-Atlantic club they founded and have long dominated, or at best a wasteful duplication of effort.
Sarkozy now has some useful support. Portuguese Defense Minister Nuno Severiano Teixeira, whose country holds the European Union’s rotating presidency, argued this week that “defense is a vital driver of European integration today. The EU must become a true defense community: Only then can it become a fully developed international actor.”
“Having a European defense system also means developing military capabilities,” Teixeira said. “We need to strengthen the rapid response capacity to deal with crisis situations.
“This includes setting up battle groups covering land, air and sea; reinforcing planning and operations management capacities; and establishing a European industrial base, with a central role for the European Defense Agency. All this should complement NATO.”
Here, or course, is the rub. Would this strengthen NATO or begin subtly to replace it? Can France and NATO really have it both ways? An interview in France’s Le Figaro this week with Gen. Henri Bentegeat, president of the EU military committee, quotes him arguing that “Paris can relaunch defense Europe.”
“I think that if France normalizes its relations with NATO, European defense projects will become easier to move forward,” he says. “With the current situation of ‘one foot in, one foot out,’ there is always a suspicion of France having a hidden agenda. If France takes a place on the same level as the others, several worries and prejudices will de defused.
“There are several possible modes of cooperation. Like in Afghanistan today, NATO could have a military responsibility and the EU a civil responsibility (police, justice missions and so on). But there is another possible way. In agreement with the U.S., during crises, we could choose the organization which is the best adapted to the mission at hand. Otherwise, there would be no point in giving the Union military capacities. The EU’s strength is possessing tools allowing a global approach, as much military as civilian.”
This all sounds promising, but in the real world there are significant differences of policy that cast doubt on French credibility, starting with France’s continued economic cooperation with Iran. Although Sarkozy’s rhetoric has been strongly supportive of the United States in the effort to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power, in the past six years the total in French-Iranian trade and investment has been more than $30 billion. And that does not include the $2 billion deal that France’s Total oil group signed to develop Iran’s South Pars field.
Earlier this year Total agreed a $2 billion venture with the government-owned National Iranian Oil Co. and Petronas of Malaysia to produce 8 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas a year -- equal to about 15 percent of current world output.
Gaz de France, having bought the rights to four of Iran’s current development blocks offered to tender for exploration and development, is negotiating with the National Iranian Gas Export Co.
The total deal could yet fall apart, though Iran’s oil minister, Vaziri Hamaneh, said last week negotiations were still under way over the Pars project, which includes Iran’s first LNG export terminal. But Total Chief Executive Officer Christophe de Margerie has warned development costs were soaring out of control and the deal was under pressure from “geopolitical forces.” De Margerie also faces legal problems, having been placed under investigation by French magistrates over suspicions the original 1997 deal involved corruption.
So it could be that the Total deal, and maybe some of its leading executives, could start to look like a political sacrifice by France to convince the Americans that Paris’s intentions toward NATO are honorable and genuine. We shall see. But the problems of finding a credible command sufficient to satisfy French pride, and the U.S. worries over the implications of a European defense identity, still lie in wait.
