U.S. Army wastes billions not supervising contractors in Iraq

WASHINGTON, Feb. 4 (UPI) -- On Jan. 2, 2008, Staff Sgt. Ryan Maseth of the 5th Special Forces Group died of cardiac arrest after being electrocuted while taking a shower in his barracks in Baghdad.

According to a New York Times report published Jan. 22, Amber A. Wojnar, the Army criminal special agent, said her investigation, although not final, had found credible information that negligence by contractors and those who supervised them may have contributed to Maseth's death. In addition, internal Pentagon documents indicate that at least 18 Americans have been electrocuted in Iraq and poor electrical work may have caused hundreds of fires and other damage at American bases.

Among military bureaucrats and the contractors they hire, there is frequently a pervasive culture of mediocrity and a near total absence of customer service. They nearly always will do things that are easier for themselves rather than providing services that meet the needs of their customer -- in this case, the soldiers in the field.

Woe to anyone who insists that contractors actually do their jobs. I once persisted on such a course of action, and finally I received a polite note from an U.S.-based military bureaucrat removing me from supervising that contractor's work. It was obviously too much to ask that the contractor perform up to standard.

Such an outcome inevitably will occur when a military bureaucrat has hired that particular contractor. It might necessitate admitting a mistake and dictate such an extreme measure as taking corrective action.

This sort of behavior stems largely from the often cozy relationships developed between contractors and military bureaucrats, whether the latter are career military officers or Department of Defense civilian employees. Upon retirement, many of these military bureaucrats themselves become contractors, some joining the same firms with whom they dealt officially. It is a sure bet that many of these newly minted contractors will be just as incompetent in their new role as they were as military bureaucrats.

In Iraq, I overheard a contractor advising a recently arrived colleague to do "the minimum," or else all the contractors would be expected to accomplish much more. The object, in this case, is not to get things done, but simply to be seen as in the process of getting things done. That is, motion without progress.

In their eyes, for example, sending an e-mail message requesting an action is the same as the task being completed. There is never any need for follow-up, because bureaucratic motion can be drawn out just long enough for any proposed action to be overtaken by events.

Prolonging the problem is one method to achieve a continued revenue stream. With no solid metrics to measure productivity and with a steady turnover of those managing the contractors, there can be little accountability regarding whether the project was completed on time and on budget or if a particular service is actually adding value. All this represents a microcosm of potential waste in wartime contracts.

A Washington Post report published Feb. 2 describes massive waste, fraud and a lack of accountability in the $50 billion relief and reconstruction project in Iraq, most of it done by private U.S. contractors.

According to Stuart Bowen, the congressionally mandated special inspector general for Iraqi reconstruction, many of the same mistakes will likely occur again in Afghanistan, because none of the substantive changes in oversight, contracting and reconstruction planning or personnel assignments that Congress, auditors and outside experts proposed for Iraq have been implemented in Afghanistan.

The waste of government money is unfortunate, but the death of a soldier due to possible managerial incompetence is both inexcusable and tragic.

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(Lawrence C. Sellin, Ph.D., is a U.S. Army reservist and Afghanistan veteran who is currently serving in Iraq.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)