Why Iran's leaders fear the United States

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 (UPI) -- Iran's leaders fear the temptations that the United States can offer their people. They know that two previous Iranian revolutions were aborted by the defection of Westernized elites, and they fear that better relations with Washington will pose a growing threat to their hold on power. Moreover, making the hard compromises that would be necessary to open the door to improved relations would undermine the legitimacy of their revolutionary ideology and weaken their claim to leadership of the Muslim world.

The Islamic Republic of Iran may go through the motions of a diplomatic dialogue, as it often has in the past, to deflect pressure for more international sanctions and temporarily defuse the nuclear standoff. But a Grand Bargain strategy is likely to result in endless talks about talks that will only enable Iran to buy time to run out the clock as it completes a nuclear weapon.

The incoming Obama administration will have to recognize that diplomatic carrots alone will not work, because for Tehran, attaining a nuclear weapon is the biggest carrot.

The EU trio's diplomatic outreach was heavily based on the offer of economic benefits, technological assistance and improved diplomatic relations in exchange for Iran's halting of its uranium-enrichment activities, but these incentives pale in comparison with the advantages that the regime believes it will attain with a nuclear weapons capability.

What is needed is greater focus on tougher disincentives for continuation of Iran's suspect nuclear efforts, including its perceived economic, domestic political, and potential military costs.

When leaders in Tehran perceive these potential costs as very high, as they did after the Bush administration overthrew hostile regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran will be more likely to make concessions and freeze its uranium-enrichment program. To give diplomacy a chance, the United States and its allies must credibly threaten to impose rising costs on the regime, particularly in ways that threaten its hold on power, which is its highest priority.

Opening a U.S. interest section in Tehran would be in the national interest only if American diplomats received ironclad safeguards against terrorism and hostage-taking, which is not possible as long as Iran continues its efforts to support terrorism against American troops, coalition allies and Iraqis.

The Obama administration also must be cognizant of the timing of any offer, which could be construed by Tehran as a sign of weakness. Making an offer before Iran's June elections would enhance Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's political prospects and should be avoided.

--

(Part 5: The case for strengthening targeted economic sanctions against Iran)

--

(James Phillips is senior research fellow for Middle Eastern affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Peter Brookes is senior fellow for national security affairs in the Davis Institute at The Heritage Foundation.)

--

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)