Outside View: Russia's war -- Part 1

MOSCOW, Sept. 2 (UPI) -- Russia has completed its "peace enforcement" operation on the territory of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. The country's political leaders and military commanders have announced that they are withdrawing troops from the conflict zone.

It is still too soon to speak about an end to the conflict between the former Soviet republic of Georgia and the unrecognized republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Georgia regards as rebellious regions, but the results of Russia's military operation can already be summed up. Likewise one can sum up the results of some world processes and consider possible future developments.

So, the contradictions that have been building up between Russia and the West, especially the United States, since the late 1990s, have erupted to the surface, the masks of beatific political correctness and cooperation in the global war on terror are off. And we witness the start of a new spiral in history -- once again the history of confrontation between two superpowers, each trying to build the world to its taste.

Like every avalanche, this one began with a spec of sand, Georgia's attempt to establish "constitutional order" in South Ossetia. That operation merits a closer look. The omnibus term "establishing constitutional order" can mean almost diametrically opposite things at different historical junctures. Nonetheless, though, there are some basic characteristics that must be present in any operation that claims that name.

To what extent did Georgia's operation to restore constitutional order in South Ossetia meet these characteristics? The first characteristic is selective fire on illegal armed units and minimization of civilian casualties. Obviously, this operation does not qualify: The Georgian artillery shelled Tskhinvali and the surrounding villages, and many facts of murder and violence against civilians are known.

The second and no less important characteristic is the humanitarian component, namely, a commitment to early restoration of law and order and life support for civilians in the zone of operations. That component takes the shape of deployment of a network of medical aid centers, field hospitals, and stocks of food, water and other prime necessities in the area to ease the suffering of innocent civilians in the context of a military operation. Georgia did none of these things.

On balance, Georgia's actions before and during the invasion of South Ossetia suggest that the aim of the Georgian leadership was to exterminate South Ossetia's non-Georgian population or cause it to flee to Russia. Under the Russian Criminal Code such actions are described as genocide.

In addition, Georgia directly violated international norms by opening fire on Russian peacekeeping units, and what is more, Georgian peacekeepers took part in firing. Based on these combined characteristics, the Russian response to the shelling and subsequent invasion by Georgian troops that began in the early hours of Aug. 8 was absolutely legitimate: The troops of the 58th Army of the North Caucasus Military District moved to help the peacekeepers.

As early as the night of Aug. 8 there were the first reports of airstrikes on Georgian troops. Many military experts believe that without these raids the South Ossetian militia would not have beaten off the first assault on Tskhinvali.

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(Next: How the war progressed)

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(Ilya Kramnik is a military commentator for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)