Russia's Iran nuke role

MOSCOW, Dec. 28 (UPI) -- According to Zalmay Khalilzad, the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, the Iranian Six -- the United States, Russia, China and the European trio of Britain, France and Germany -- have at last reached a consensus.

The situation around the Iranian nuclear file reads like a crime novel, especially in view of the latest surprise moves by Tehran.

Iran has found an original method of protecting its uranium enrichment program and avoiding sanctions for doing so. Or at least of making the sanctions look illegitimate in the eyes of Iran and the world community.

Gholamreza Agazade, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, has said that Iran is currently building its own nuclear power plant with a 360 megawatts capacity and intends to produce fuel for that plant itself, at an enrichment center in Natanz.

In light of the "natural requirements" of nuclear fuel, Iran will not only lessen the curtailment of its enrichment program, but, on the contrary, possibly increase the number of centrifuges at Natanz from 3,000 to 50,000 units.

According to Agazade, 3,000 centrifuges can supply only one nuclear plant of 100 megawatts.

Agazade's timing for his sensational statement was perfect. It came after Moscow and Washington made public their stands on the start of nuclear fuel deliveries to the Bushehr plant from Russia.

They said that the deliveries created the necessary conditions for Iran to fulfill the U.N. Security Council resolutions and International Atomic Energy Agency recommendations "to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program."

It was further said that Iran did not need its own enrichment facility, because the Bushehr plant, according to contract terms, would always be provided with Russian fuel.

Tehran jumped at the chance offered by such placatory remarks from Washington and said it was building yet another nuclear plant on its own and will produce the fuel for it itself.

Iran is formally correct by saying that nuclear fuel deliveries to the Bushehr plant are not connected with its nuclear program. To judge by everything, the Iranian leadership held the nuclear plant at Darkhovin, which is the plant concerned, as an ace in the hole.

It is a different matter if that "formality" will be enough to avoid sanctions.

The Persian language has a saying that fits the Darkhovin situation perfectly: A smart duck is trapped twice. The same fate may await Iran.

But there is one "but" that Tehran prefers to avoid. In line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA recommendations, Iran should have informed the agency of the project. Tehran could not have known that. Most likely, the Darkhovin scenario is a little trick. If it is established that Iran did some work secretly, sanctions are unavoidable.

Meanwhile, the U.S. response to the Russia-Iran agreement on fuel supplies to Bushehr has been mixed: While the American administration welcomed it, the expert community again accused Moscow of "collusion with Tehran."

The New York Times described the first shipment of low-enriched uranium to Bushehr as all but a body blow to U.S. prestige. Journalists said that the American administration, by supporting the Russian deliveries to Bushehr, lost its "long-going battle with Russia." Now, they say, the Iranian Six has no teeth to enforce punishment on Tehran for refusing to freeze its uranium enrichment program.

Why should an influential newspaper start scattering the ashes so soon? It emerges, as diplomats and administration representatives told The New York Times privately, that Russia's decision to supply nuclear fuel means support for Iran.

In December of last year Moscow backed sanctions against Iran, and some Russian experts accused it of an anti-Iranian plot with the United States. Now the supplies of nuclear fuel to Iran, especially in agreement with Washington, can be interpreted at will -- including as a well-played spectacle by Russia and Tehran.

Given the wish, this scenario can easily fit in both the American missile defense shield in Europe and the Kosovo situation.

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(Pyotr Goncharov is a political analyst for RIA Novosti. This article is reprinted by permission of RIA Novosti. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.)

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