Outside View: JASSM in crisis -- Part 1

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 (UPI) -- When it comes to weapons procurement, the United States is its own worst enemy.

Witness the flawed hull design that sabotaged the Coast Guard’s Deepwater fleet modernization effort, the glitch-plagued and crash-marred 26-year development of the MV-22 Osprey headed for deployment in Iraq, and the inexcusable cost escalation in the Littoral Combat Ship program -- triggering cancellation of Lockheed Martin’s follow-on prototype.

Then there’s the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile -- JASSM. In development for 11 years, it has experienced ongoing problems with components in its engine, warhead, power, electrical and other systems. During tests in Utah this spring, three missiles reportedly missed their targets and the fourth suffered detonation failure.

Instead of canceling this flawed $5.8 billion program, the Pentagon has again deferred final decisions until next spring. What about the roughly 600 JASSMs already fielded? A leading industry journal reported that “at least 512 of (them) could have flaws related to the GPS guidance system.”

Meanwhile, despite a 42-percent failure rate in testing since December and major JASSM cost overruns already reported to Congress, Lockheed Martin continues to crank them out -- even though, according to another aviation publication, “the Air Force has suspended acceptance of more missiles until analysis of the problems is complete.” Weapons procurement has its own unique logic.

Appropriately, at the 2007 Paris air show, Sue Payton, head of U.S. Air Force procurement, attended briefings on Europe’s Taurus and Storm Shadow cruise missiles as possible JASSM replacements. SLAM-ER, an upgraded Harpoon, has also been mentioned.

And what about the Tomahawk? Following the Gulf War, the Defense Department’s initial report of a “98-percent success rate for Tomahawk and attack missile launches” with an earlier guidance package than the current GPS version was directly contradicted by the General Accounting Office’s 1997 analysis citing results closer to 50 percent at best.

Several highly accurate contemporary cruise missiles employ inertial or linked inertial/GPS guidance technologies superseding earlier terrain contour matching systems. Using terminal acquisition optical systems or radar employing target-matching algorithms, these advances vastly simplify land-sea usage options.

Yet all U.S. and EU conventional cruise missiles -- many capable of being air-, ground-, ship-, or sub-launched against land targets or ships -- share this significant deficiency: Powered by small jet engines, they fly at a slow Mach 0.8. On one test flight, JASSM took 22 minutes to cover 210 miles. Stealth-enhancing composite airframes help delay radar detection, but during such 22-minute flights over enemy territory, how would JASSM and any similarly subsonic cruise missiles fare against layered, networked, multi-sensor air defense systems employing Russian-made S-300PMU -- SA-10D -- surface-to-air missiles -- or their SA-N-6 ship-based counterparts -- intercepting at a blistering 4,500 miles per hour? Russia claims they are effective against attacking aircraft, cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles at ranges of more than 100 miles and altitudes from 30,000 to 80,000 feet.

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(Theodore Gaillard writes frequently on defense issues. His articles and book reviews have appeared in Jane's Defense Weekly, Defense News, the Washington Times and other newspapers and journals around the country. He is a consultant to the Center for Defense Information's Straus Military Reform Project.)

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(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)