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BMD Focus: Why U.S. may reject Putin plan

By MARTIN SIEFF, UPI Senior News Analyst

WASHINGTON, June 18 (UPI) -- Russian President Vladimir Putin surprised the world at the G8 summit in Germany with his proposal to send real-time information from a Russian base in Azerbaijan on Iranian missile launches to the United States as a substitute for U.S. bases in Central Europe. But U.S. defense experts have told United Press International that the proposal, while attractive in theory, would be unlikely to meet U.S. security concerns in reality.

Riki Ellison, president of the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, in a statement welcomed the Russian leader's surprise offer.

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"Putin's new position on missile defense announced at the G8 Summit in Germany (indicating) ... Russia recognizes the ballistic missile threat from Iran and wishes to cooperate with the United States on missile defense is to be commended," he said.

Putin also later suggested that U.S. missile defense interceptors could be located in Turkey, Iraq and on U.S. Aegis-class warships armed with Standard Missile 3 interceptors. "They could be placed in the south, in U.S. NATO allies such as Turkey," Putin said. "They could also be placed on sea platforms."

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However, U.S. military experts, speaking on condition of anonymity, told UPI that they doubted these proposals would prove practical for U.S. policymakers to adopt for a number of reasons.

First, SM-3s are not designed to shoot down ultra-fast intercontinental ballistics missiles. The one U.S. BMD system designed to do that is the ground-based midcourse interceptor system, or GBIs, currently being deployed around Fort Greely, Alaska, and at Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif. And the GBIs are not designed to be deployed on warships.

Second, the U.S. experts said that a key reason to deploy anti-ballistic missile radars in the Czech Republic with GBIs deployed in Poland would be to intercept future Iranian ICBMs that were targeted at American cities. Basing radars in Azerbaijan would not provide the necessary data for midcourse intercepts of Iranian ICBMs by ABMs.

Third, deploying U.S. GBIs in the Mediterranean area, either on land or on warships, even if it could somehow prove practical, would put them in a very poor position to intercept Iranian ICBMs fired at the United States. Deploying them in Poland would give far better odds of shooting the Iranian ICBMs down and therefore of protecting both Western European and U.S. cities, the experts said.

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Fourth, the experts expressed concern at relying on crucial data from another nation that had to be transmitted almost instantaneously. They noted that interoperability and communications concerns remain difficult even between long-established allies, let alone setting up a system with Russia.

Finally, the experts emphasized that deploying U.S. ground-based interceptors in Poland and radars to guide them in the Czech Republic could not be construed as a threat to Russia's strategic missile deterrent against the United States because, they said, Russian ICBMs would fly a far more northerly course towards the North American continent that would not make it practical for the small number of GBIs in Poland to intercept.

Ellison, too, said that while he welcomed the Russian offer both for its spirit and for its possibility of opening up a new constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington on the issue, he did not believe the specifics of the new proposal would prove practical to implement.

"We must clearly understand that this proposal and words of advice cannot, and does not offer any protection against Iranian missiles targeted at the United States of America, United Kingdom and portions of Northern Europe," Ellison said. "The current U.S. defensive missile systems and systems that could be deployed by 2015, referred by President Putin, will not have the capability to protect these countries from long- to medium-range missiles if located in Southern NATO countries, including Turkey and Iraq."

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He also noted, "In regards to the use of the Soviet-made radar in Azerbaijan, which was put in place in the 1980s, it is not an X-band radar and cannot discriminate and process the targeting information required of the interceptors."

Ellison continued, "There is no question in terms of geography and technical capability that the national security of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Northern Europe requires a European Missile Defense Site for both interceptors and long-range radar capability to defend against a threat of ballistic missiles from Iran or other Middle Eastern countries by 2015."

Ellison also saw prospects in President Putin's proposal for increased cooperation on sharing early warning data from radars deployed in Azerbaijan. "We sincerely hope that the open cooperation on missile defense from President Putin is consistent and continues to unfold to include sharing early-warning data, forward basing U.S. X-band radars in Azerbaijan, and unified sanctions against Iran if they continue with nuclear and missile proliferation," he said in his statement.

But he concluded, "We respectfully remind President Putin that we as a nation will not be subject by a foreign leader to determine our national security and protection of our homeland."

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It is difficult to imagine that any future U.S. president, Republican or Democrat, will come to a different conclusion.

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