Analysis: Iraq's new war

The U.S. victory in Fallujah last month has backfired in prompting insurgents to switch from fighting pitched battles against U.S. forces to staging simultaneous, well-orchestrated attacks against key cities in the Sunni triangle, according to administration officials.

The rebels' new hit-and-run strategy "could pose new problems for U.S.-led forces," a Pentagon official said. "By not standing their ground and fighting, but retreating only to return to attack select targets, the rebels have put us on the defensive."

"We now lack the initiative at a time when we need it very badly," he added, saying the aim of U.S. operations was to bring stability to the Sunni triangle.

A consensus is emerging among U.S. intelligence officials that while Islamic jihadi fighters play a part in suicide bombings and harassment of U.S. troops, the driving force of the insurgency belongs to remnants of Saddam Hussein's deposed regime.

In a little-noticed press conference in Baghdad Nov. 16, Iraqi Interim Interior Minister Faleh Nagib acknowledged this situation. He said his government was fighting a unified movement that is dominated by Iraqis, not foreign fighters, and overall battle and strategic directions were being exercised by a central command -- chiefly from former Baath supporters of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein -- according to the U.K.-based MEC Analytical Group, headed by Geoffrey Hancock.

United Press International obtained a copy of Nagib's remarks as reported by the Arab News from MEC.

"Foreign fighters play a part. We found a surprising number of Saudis among the dead in Fallujah," but Baathist and Iraqi nationalists play the major part, one U.S. government analyst said.

Recently, a top Army general, George Casey Jr., said that the Iraqi resistance was being coordinated by a "new regional command," based in Syria and led by Muhammad Yunus Ahmad, a former Baathist security official, according to a Washington Post account that was confirmed by UPI sources.

Not only does Ahmad provide direction, he also arranges financing for rebel forces, many of whom are part time, Casey said.

According to a Pentagon official, the U.S. tactics used in the assault against Fallujah "were a real blunder."

In the first place, he complained, the "incredible indiscretion, if it can be called that, of announcing a U.S. attack in advance," simply allowed many Sunni hard-line insurgents and foreign jihadi fighters to escape.

Some who went into Saudi Arabia are believed to have been involved in the Dec. 6 attack on the U.S. Consulate at Jeddah, he said.

Others simply regrouped and launched simultaneous attacks on such Iraqi cities as Baiji, Baqubah, Ramadi, Haditha and Tikrit, broadening the insurgency, he said.

"In a sense, we had to attack Fallujah," said Brookings Institution military expert Mike O'Hanlon. "We had no access to the city at all."

O'Hanlon said Fallujah was providing a sanctuary for insurgents who had ruled the city via an ad hoc fundamentalist government.

But O'Hanlon added that the U.S. victory was a limited accomplishment. "Fallujah was hardly a turning point of the war," he noted.

Several U.S. military sources told UPI that the assault on Fallujah was launched with only five battalions, one of which was pulled out to go and suppress a rising in Mosul, allowing a significant number of insurgents to escape through that gap in the line.

"Of the 3,000 to 4,000 estimated insurgents, a lot got away -- as many as half," another Pentagon official said.

"It's the same story over and over," a senior Pentagon official said. "Too few men, too few forces. We have too big an area to have to defend."

According to a former senior CIA official, the recent Mosul raid was designed to distract the attention of U.S. forces away from Fallujah. The raid "killed a lot of Kurds," heightened ethnic tensions, drew 1,200 U.S. troops away from Ramadi and Fallujah, and prompted 300 newly recruited Iraqi police to desert.

The insurgents then launched fresh attacks on Baqubah and Samarra, this source said.

"The insurgents have grasped that we cannot be everywhere at once, and they can hit us where they wish, and we can't do anything about it," this source said.

O'Hanlon agreed, noting, "The guerrillas are building on their growing strength."

According to a serving U.S. intelligence source, "This is becoming a classic guerrilla contest where our forces tend to be fixed in place, while theirs (the insurgents) have the advantages of mobility and surprise and can strike, then vanish at will into the populace."

O'Hanlon said that was the case. "The insurgents have an incredible ability to hide themselves within the general population," he pointed out.

Another U.S. official said that since the insurgents basically exercise control over the Sunni cities in the central heartland of Iraq, the chances of Sunni participation in the upcoming elections in January "is basically nil."

With the Sunnis comprising 20 percent of the population, their snubbing the elections cannot be taken lightly, he said.

U.S. intelligence experts continue to try and create a guerrilla order of battle that shows their exact numbers, locations and leaders. According to the U.S. military, there are about 11,000 to 20,000 insurgents spread throughout Iraq, the New York Times reported.

But a former senior CIA official said that a network that could number as high as 100,000 is supporting this group.

"The problem is, this number is growing," he added.

Former CIA counter-terrorism chief Vince Cannistraro concurred, saying, "In spite of all our efforts to divide and weaken this insurgency, it is deepening and spreading."

One well-informed French intelligence source was told by Iranian sources there were about 7,500 foreign fighters in Iraq.