Analysis: After Beslan -- the rage

MOSCOW, Sept. 6 (UPI) -- In the Russian Orthodox Church, to which most residents of North Ossetia belong, the dead are mourned for forty days. For the survivors of the hostage tragedy, and for those who lost family members in the orgy of killing at Beslan's School Number 1, once the mourning period is over it will be time for revenge. Russian intellectuals and many Western commentators lament the lack of a strong and independent Russian society -- but the residents of North Ossetia will demonstrate what that society can do when it has a cause.

The tremendous loss of life, primarily the wanton killing of children, has engaged Russian society -- something remarkably rare after the upheavals of the past decade. Russians are an amazingly stoic and cynical people by any standards. But the destruction of a generation in a small Russian town has awakened a strong and natural instinct -- national survival.

The bloodletting in Beslan will be remembered for a long time, and is likely to be the catalyst for average citizens in the North Caucasus to take matters into their own hands. The best and the worst elements of Russian national identity are poised to strike, with the Kremlin only catching up to take credit for, or disavow, the outcome.

Interethnic conflict in the North Caucasus has periodically flared since the collapse of the Soviet Union -- now it is a near certainty. The question is whether the Kremlin can contain what could spill over into an interethnic, inter-republic civil war. It appears likely that it could not, given its handling of recent tragic events in the region.

For most of the past decade, Chechen militants have attempted to export interethnic conflict and violence beyond Chechnya's borders with the intent to destabilize the North Caucasus. Chechen fighter Shamil Basayev's incursion into neighboring Dagestan in 1999 was the most spectacular attempt to drag the entire region into Chechnya's turmoil. Basayev, and whoever else was involved, failed in the end, only to have Russian troops return to Chechnya in what is now called the Second Chechen war. The Beslan hostage takers have succeeded where Basayev failed.

North Ossetia has traditionally been loyal to Moscow. That loyalty has been shaken, possibly irreparably, after last week's slaughter. Vladimir Putin's visit to Beslan on Saturday under the cover of darkness did not impress local residents; nor did local officials, who had appeared mindful of Kremlin concerns throughout the hostage crisis, and abandoned the townspeople to grieve on their own. North Ossetians no longer believe Moscow can protect them from violence in the region. Still in a state of shock, they probably now believe they can only protect themselves.

Self-protection most likely will be focused against neighboring Ingushetia. Ossetian-Ingush relations have never been good -- the two fought a mini-war in 1992. The Ingush, exiled along with the Chechens during World War II, started to return to their traditional homeland in the 1950s, much to the displeasure of the Ossetians. The fact that an Ingush was among the hostage takers will be more than good reason to retaliate, irrespective of what the Kremlin intends to do to keep the two sides apart.

Until recently, Ingushetia has been able to carefully maneuver between militant Chechens on its border and the Kremlin's heavy-handed approach to eliminating dissent in the region. That all changed for Ingushetia in June when a band of rebels invaded the town of Nazran, killing over 90 local and security services personnel. Chechen militants have been blamed for the incursion, as well as a new group of Ingush Islamic radicals.

What happens next may be beyond the Kremlin's control. The regional authorities in North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Chechnya are all widely believed to be corrupt and lacking local support. The economies of all three are fragile at best, with budgets stolen, ever-present corruption and pervasive unemployment. The only meaningful leverage the Kremlin has is military and security presence. However, with the incursion in Nazran and the attack on Beslan, that leverage has been severely compromised.

At this point, the most important political casualty of the Beslan tragedy is the loss of moderates in the region calling for restraint. With Moscow seemingly incapable of providing security in the region, local radicals bent on violence and revenge are gaining popular support.

The ongoing tragedy in Chechnya has engulfed all of the North Caucasus. As it spreads, Moscow's grip on the region dissipates. Local populations are left alone to determine their own destinies and identities. Civil society, always weak in the region and in Russia as a whole, is taking a nasty turn. Respect for authority and the rule of law is at a dangerous low in the North Caucasus, creating a backdrop for further violence.

The Kremlin claims the hostage takers in Beslan forced it to storm the school, leaving over 350 dead and more than 600 people injured. During the assault on the school the townspeople of Beslan, also armed, fought beside federal troops. This is a very important reminder of what the future might hold. Local populations in the region are armed and now enraged with burning hatred and a desire for revenge.

The Kremlin was powerless to stop terrorists from seizing the Beslan school on Sept. 1. It was powerless to save Beslan's children. There is no reason to believe the Kremlin has the power to stop another vicious round of ethnic strife in the North Caucasus. There is every reason to believe the residents of North Ossetia will not wait much longer than forty days to avenge the loss of Beslan's children.

(Peter Lavelle is an independent Moscow-based analyst and the author of the electronic newsletter on Russia "Untimely Thoughts" untimely-thoughts.com.)