SACRAMENTO, Aug. 6 (UPI) -- "Davis is on a course of near certain approval ... the anti-recall strategy of keeping all replacement Democrats off the ballot is all but certain to elect a Republican governor unless the Republicans fail to provide an attractive alternative" -- Republican analyst Tony Quinn.
"Initiatives that start out at around 50 percent in the polls nearly always lose ... we firmly believe that the recall is eminently beatable." -- Paul Maslin and Ben Tulchin, pollsters for Gov. Gray Davis.
The forces seeking to remove California Gov. Gray Davis via a recall election won the first round of their fight on July 23 when California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley certified the petitions to force the recall. California's first ever recall for a state constitutional office will occur Oct. 7.
Barring the courts intervening to delay or halt the election, a historic confrontation will occur this fall. The dynamics of this unprecedented election are almost impossible to predict. Not only has this never occurred in California, a recall of a governor in any state hasn't happened since North Dakota Gov. Lynn Frazier was recalled in 1921.
Whichever side gets their voters out will be key. Davis needs a highly motivated Democratic base and a weak GOP effort. Obviously, with no prior experience, recall turnout can only be guessed.
But the whole shooting match may come down to how voters view this recall: if a majority sees it as a chance to express "no confidence" in Davis, he's clearly in deep trouble. But if the voters view this as just another policy option like an initiative that appears every year on the California ballot, the governor will have a decent chance to convince voters that the alternatives to keeping him are not worth the risk.
In "The Real Majority," Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg commented, "there is little real sense in playing the political 'what if' game -- except that it is addictive." Well, the California recall will spark more "what if" scenarios than any event since the Clinton impeachment. It's possible that a racial privacy law put on the ballot by affirmative action opponent Ward Connerly could impact the election, but the guess here is the big issue will be Davis and the recall concept itself.
In every Californian poll, Davis has lost popularity since the energy crisis of 2001. His comeback will have to begin right now or it's all over. The governor won a significant victory last Saturday when he signed the state budget into law, thus removing a huge potential irritant. But he's still behind in the polls.
California law requires that 12 percent of the voters in the last gubernatorial election sign valid petitions in order to trigger a recall. That is almost 900,000 voters in this case.
The recall proponents began their work almost immediately after Davis was narrowly re-elected in 2002. They were making scant progress until Rep. Darryl Issa, R-Calif., a self-made millionaire, donated nearly $2 million to hire professional signature-gatherers. After that, the recall quickly gained momentum. The pro-recall forces eventually turned in more than 1.6 million signatures, nearly twice the required number. The recall was certified a full six weeks before the final deadline. California's Supreme Court, on July 25, rejected a request by Davis to delay the Oct. 7 special election. It's still theoretically possible that a federal or state court could stop the election, but it looks like the recall question will occur this fall, most likely Oct. 7 or Nov. 4.
Regardless of the timing, there will be two questions on the ballot: a) Should Davis be recalled; and b) If he is recalled, who should replace him? The first question is decided by a simple majority: if 50 percent plus one of the total votes cast are to keep the governor in office, the process is over. But if a majority votes "yes" to recall, the second question is a non-partisan "winner-take-all" election. There is no need to obtain a majority, whoever gets the most votes that day is the governor-elect.
The first question is the only one that concerns Davis and his team. This article will deal with the fate of Davis and possible public opinion scenarios. Future articles will analyze potential replacement candidates, such as Issa.
Both The Los Angeles Times and the Field Poll surveyed registered voters on a possible recall before the vote was scheduled. These surveys showed that a slight majority of respondents favored recalling the governor with more than 40 percent opposed. But that was only a potential question about one possible future. The first poll taken after the recall was certified was done for local media outlets. It showed that 46 percent of respondents were for recalling Davis, 20 percent were opposed, 33 percent said it would depend on the alternative successors and 1 percent didn't know.
Let's start with the 20 percent of respondents who say they will definitely vote against the recall. This likely represents the hardcore Democratic base and closely tracks Davis' job approval rating.
The figure of 46 percent in support of the recall is very close to the 42 percent of the total vote that Republican Bill Simon received in November 2002. We can estimate that the pro-recall forces have a base of at least 40 percent.
So, to survive, Davis must obviously weaken the "yes" vote and sweep the undecided vote. What are his chances of doing so?
Any polling data should have the caveat that they are "snapshots" of public opinion at a given time and not necessarily a prediction of future behavior (a lesson we all learned on Election Night 2000 in Florida).
As Elmo Roper, one of the fathers of polling methodology once said, "if I could predict public opinion, I wouldn't need to measure it." It's at least possible that some dramatic, unforeseen event -- an earthquake, another terrorist attack -- could permanently change the dynamics of the recall.
But if there is no great change in the political climate, Davis' best chance for survival will depend on convincing voters that recall is too extreme a measure for their discontent. The governor and his surrogates will have to persuade a majority of Californians that the state's problems are not solely Davis' fault (almost every state is going through a budget crisis) and that replacing him will not even to begin to solve them.
In fact, this strategy of raising doubts about a hot new idea is how opponents seek to defeat initiatives. Over the past generation, numerous policy initiatives -- a big income tax cut in 1980, gun registration in 1982, the massive environmental regulation called "Big Green" in 1990, "right-to-die" legislation in 1992, an upper-bracket tax increase in 1996 and labor law reform in 1998 -- have started out ahead, but ended up losing when opponents succeeded in raising doubts about the end results of these ideas. As Democratic consultant Darry Sragow has observed, the best way to defeat an initiative is to say that it is too flawed to accomplish its announced goals.
The Davis camp is clearly using this tack. It is loudly proclaiming that the recall is a huge waste of time and taxpayers' money, that it will divert attention from the state's real problems and that it could result in a genuine constitutional crisis if the voting is too close to call like Florida in the 2000 election. Davis consultants Maslin and Tulchin recommend an "ideal" sound bite: "The recall will cost taxpayers an additional $60 million and is a partisan effort by Republicans to pursue their right-wing conservative agenda."
Davis adviser Garry South, adding on, questioned why anyone would even want to win the replacement election: "What have you won? You get no transition period. The budget deficit doesn't go away. It doesn't bring the economy back. The highlight of your career will be the day you are elected. It will be all downhill from there." That's a fancy way of saying that while things may not be going all that well under Davis, the situation will likely get a lot worse under a new person.
Can this essentially negative strategy work? It will depend on voters' perception of the state's condition and their desire for change.
According to recent polls, nearly two-thirds of all Californians believe that the state is on the wrong track and in a serious recession. Fully 69 percent of California voters disapprove of Davis and, unfortunately for him, the trend has been consistently downward since the energy crisis hit in 2001. Unless Davis makes at least a perception of some progress, this strategy could fall victim to the voters' desire for change.
In dramatic contrast to the governor's consultants, Quinn, a Republican analyst, argues that it's virtually impossible for Davis to win. When people are unhappy, the greatest slogan is "it's time for a change" and that's the best idea recall advocates have working for them. Davis' foes start out with the concept that most Californians just don't like their governor. They point not only to the governor's record-low job ratings, but the stark fact that a majority of real voters (53 percent) did not want him to remain in office in 2002 when he was re-elected with 47 percent of the vote.
With roughly two-thirds of Californians saying that the state is on the wrong track, the big fear for Democrats is that voters will take out their frustrations on the governor. In this way, Davis could be compared to a presidential incumbent.
Since 1956 when President Dwight Eisenhower was re-elected handily, the Gallup Poll has shown an interesting pattern in races with an incumbent president. In every case since 1950, most of the undecided vote has gone to the challenger. The reason for this pattern is that presidents have virtually 100-percent name recognition. If after several years of holding the office, the average voter is still undecided about the man in office, then they probably don't like the president and will vote against him.
Basically, with an incumbent running, what you see in the final Gallup Poll is what they get on Election Day. For example, in 1956 Eisenhower was ahead of Adlai Stevenson 59 percent to 40 percent. He won 57 percent vs. 42 percent. In 1976, President Gerald Ford led Jimmy Carter 47 percent to 46 percent in the final Gallup Poll. The undecided broke for Carter over the final weekend and he won 50 percent to 48 percent.
The most famous example of this phenomenon is the campaign of 1980. All through September and October of that year, the polls showed a very close race between President Carter and Ronald Reagan. Prior to the debate on Oct. 28, 1980, Carter led Reagan 45 percent vs. 39 percent in the Gallup Poll. A few days after the debate, Reagan reversed his fortunes by taking a 47 percent to 44 percent lead. Carter's campaign handlers still insisted that they could win because the undecided bloc of voters would realize that electing Reagan was too much of a risk. They could not have been more wrong. Virtually all of the undecided went against Carter and a relatively close election was turned into a Reagan rout.
This is the most dangerous scenario for Davis. If he is viewed as simply a presidential-like incumbent, then the voters pretty much know all they need to after five years in office. If so, we can expect the undecided to break heavily against him. If he's the equivalent to Carter, he'll need a miracle to retain office.
Based on those standards, which side has the edge here?
Quinn's thinking implies that the voters have already decided that they intensely dislike Davis and will almost "mechanically" march to the polls to oust him just as they voted overwhelmingly for Proposition 13 in 1978 when they were upset over high taxes.
On the other hand, Maslin and Tulchin believe that once voters realize the cost and controversy of this election and see the potential for chaos and the likelihood that it won't solve any of the state's fundamental problems, recall supporters will eventually slide toward minority status. By this light, the recall will be just another intriguing, trendy West Coast idea that doesn't stand up to serious scrutiny. Maslin is hoping that the undecided bloc will end up supporting Davis en masse.
There is, of course, a third possibility for the undecided voters: instead of shifting decisively one way, they could split almost evenly or just not vote, thus freezing the election for the leader of the final polling. Since this is California's first statewide recall election, it's anybody's guess as to which way the voters will break at the end.
Who is right: Quinn or Maslin? Davis' political survival hangs on that question.
We can only make an educated guess, we simply don't know how voters will view a recall election: as a chance to vent their anger or as a serious policy change to be made only with great care. Support for the recall has consistently increased all year.
If that trend continues now that the election is about to become a reality, it will indicate that California sees this as a "no confidence" vote and the governor is almost certainly doomed. But if voters begin to show some second thoughts over the next few weeks when the alternatives become clear, Davis can win.
--
(Patrick Reddy is a Democratic political consultant in California.)
