Far Horizon: The struggle that must be won

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2 (UPI) -- President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have carefully warned their fellow citizens of a long, difficult and probably costly struggle against Osama bin Laden and his al Qaida terrorist network.

But what does this mean? And are there any relevant historical examples that provide insights into the length and likely hardships of the fight against what Bush calls "the evil ones?"

For the United States, the longest hot war it fought, outside domestic ones against crime, drugs, poverty and injustice, was Vietnam lasting from 1961 until Saigon fell in 1975. Americans fought in World War I for 20 months and World War II for 3 1/2 years; the British for 4 and nearly 6 years, respectively.

Britain's most expensive war, measured in blood and treasure, was the first. For America, it was the Civil War. But none of those conflicts is entirely relevant to the current battle against terror and extremism because there is no obvious enemy state or army after whose defeat victory can be proclaimed.

A better example is the Cold War and a global, monolithic communist-based threat in which both sides possessed the means to destroy each other many times over. Despite the risks of mutual annihilation, casualties, including proxy wars fought in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan, were modest in comparison to the world wars of the 20th century. In the end, there was a surprisingly unexpected and peaceful resolution to that war in which the good guys actually won.

Bin Laden, his associates and the forces that they have exploited and that have enabled this exploitation, are a 21st century mutation of the global threat of communism, possibly with even greater dangers than the Cold War because there is no obvious calculus of mutual deterrence at work.

Bin Laden's cause is extremist and his aim is essentially systemic overthrow. Like Marx and Lenin, religion is indeed an opiate used in this case as a siren's song to seduce and attract the fidayin prepared to become martyrs in the service of creating a radical Pan-Islamic condominium.

But unlike Lenin, success is not dependent upon seizing and ruling a country first in order to begin the revolution that ultimately creates the Marxist utopia of a workers' paradise. Nor does it require armed forces as large and powerful as the Red Army.

And, bin Laden has cunningly twisted Lenin's decree that communism would provide the rope with which capitalism would hang itself. His tactic is to turn the greatest strengths and assets of free societies --- their openness --- into vulnerabilities to be shattered whether by commercial airlines made into flying bombs or biological or other mass destruction weapons used not only to kill but to disrupt and terrorize.

Thus, the danger presented by bin Laden's extremism may be more diabolical and difficult to defeat because it is not dependent on the traditional measures of power and influence and is insensitive to the West's longstanding model of deterrence.

In the two world wars, strategy was clear: defeat the enemy's military power and the enemy is defeated. But that strategy could not and did not work in Vietnam or in the Cold War because it was the political conflict and not an enemy's military power that counted. And, in crushing bin Laden and removing the causes and consequences that will create future dangers, it is the political context that matters most.

This writer has advocated recreating some form of a Marshall Plan to deal with the longer-term. However, as the Bush administration recognizes, there needs to be a coalition of the willing, operating much like a kaleidoscope's pattern coming together and then dispersing when no longer needed. And, perhaps most importantly, there needs to be a strategic focus with specific aims and objectives that are both clearly understood and attainable. Merely destroying bin Laden, al Qaida and those who support him is necessary. But it will not be sufficient to solve the entire problem and relieve the danger.

Focus must be placed on neutralizing extremism in any form, as fascism and then communism were defeated. Since bullets alone cannot kill an -ism or an ideology, it is the political context that is most important. In this case, the extremists have relied on terrorism. However, terrorism is a weapon and not a cause. The two have been confused.

In this regard, a lengthy struggle seems inevitable. However, it is a struggle that can and must be won. Because, if it is not, our way of life is as much at risk as it was in 1941 and 1949. This is what must be explained to the public. If Bush and Blair can do that, this will be a giant first step.

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(Harlan Ullman is a UPI columnist.)