Analysis: Nuke security B+ hard to qualify

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 (UPI) -- When Sen. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., issued a report card on U.S. homeland security efforts since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, nuclear plant security received the highest marks. But the B+ grade was coupled with scathing sketches of persisting problems.

The Nuclear Energy Institute, a leading industry group, says "the industry has invested $1.2 billion in security-related improvements" to the 64 civilian nuclear plants in the country.

"These include extending and fortifying security perimeters, installing new barriers to protect against potential vehicle bombs, installing additional high-tech surveillance equipment, and increasing security forces by 60 percent," according to details from a recent presentation by Adm. Frank L. 'Skip' Bowman, U.S. Navy, retired, president and chief executive officer NEI.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission also talks about nuclear security with confidence. Many details are kept a secret -- for security reasons -- so an accurate analysis hinges on the word of government officials, claims by those with vested interests, and assessments by those with homeland security expertise.

Schumer's report card, released Sept. 4, praised the NRC for "strictly regulated" nuclear plants and continued progress. The NRC has requested $70.3 million for its fiscal year 2007 security budget, down from $79.3 million budgeted this year but $11 million more than 2005.

"We are pleased that the Senator acknowledged the significant work the NRC has done in enhancing security at nuclear power plants in the past five years," wrote Scott Burnell, spokesman for the NRC, in an e-mail interview with United Press International.

But Schumer's grade, citing reports by the Government Accountability Office, criticized the NRC's Design Basis Threat -- standards each plant must meet in defending off an attack -- and the ability of plants to meet the DBT, details of which the NRC keeps secret.

"We are confident in the basis of our DBT," Burnell wrote, when asked about the attack scenarios.

He also wrote that there have been numerous reviews, assessments and changes in security in how the NRC and the nuclear plants it regulates operate since the attacks. This includes work with the U.S. Energy Department in determining consequences of airlines crashing into reactors, and working with the North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command to create an early warning system.

"NRC has utilized the insights from its classified research on security assessments to direct that appropriate imminent threat procedures be developed at each power reactor," NRC Chairman Dale Klein wrote in an Aug. 28 letter to Michael Chertoff, secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

Dave Lochbaum, director of the Nuclear Safety Project with the Union of Concerned Scientists, said Schumer's report card shows improvements, but not enough.

"You'd think five years after 9-11 we'd get some A's," said Lochbaum. He's worried "if we have A-team terrorists come in and have a B+ response."

Lochbaum said the NRC's has increased its look at security, especially in "force-on-force" training -- how well the security apparatus at the plant fares against a simulated attack -- as well as background checks of prospective employees to obtain security clearance.

But recent security lapses at nuclear plants -- including the South Texas Project near Houston, Turkey Point in Florida City, Fla., and the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant near Chattanooga, Tenn., -- show regulators "still have some work to do," Lochbaum said. "These aren't isolated events."

Burnell wrote the NRC has boosted the minimum requirements for security forces each plant must meet, the specifics of which are secret.

"Security at nuclear plants doesn't keep me up at night," said James Carafano, an expert in homeland security issues and senior research fellow at The Heritage Foundation.

"It's the best critical infrastructure protection program in the country," he said, even with the vulnerability of nuclear waste in its cooling process, which he calls the "Achilles heel" of nuclear plant security.

He called Schumer's report card a "political document absent of analytical rigor," full of "assumptions and pronouncements."

Neither Schumer nor his staff returned numerous calls and e-mails from United Press International.

Regardless, Carafano noted, "one of the problems in talking about nuclear security is a lot of it is classified."

Indeed, regulators often answer specific security questions with the 'just trust us' attitude.

Peter Stockton, spokesman for the Project On Government Oversight, a leading Washington watchdog, said the extent of secrecy is unnecessary.

"They don't have to say 'hey, guess what terrorists? You can get in through this particular fence'."

Stockton said the NRC should create a better dialogue with the public, so there is no lack of trust. He said when something goes wrong at a nuclear plant the NRC doesn't have to answer questions, "because of the classification of things they can get away with this stuff."

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